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Abstract 
We analyze a multi-country model in which a small group of countries adopts banking 
secrecy (BS) laws and a withholding tax. The other group doesn't. BS countries benefit in all 
relevant macroeconomic variables, including taxes and the provision of public goods. In non-
BS countries most of the same variables deteriorate - when tax evasion is exogenous or its 
tax elasticity is moderate. When this elasticity is high, BS may drive these countries' tax rates 
down also, and income, consumption and wealth may rise. However, public-goods provision 
always deteriorates and welfare falls. We also argue that this case does not appear to be 
relevant empirically. 
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E2, E62, F42, H2 1 Introduction
Pairing a strictly enforced banking secrecy law with an attractive withhold-
ing tax on capital incomes is bound to have serious repercussions on both
the national and international economies. The suspected gravity of such
spillovers has ignited an intensive international debate and tug of war be-
tween countries that feature banking secrecy laws on one side and the rest of
the international community on the other. Among the most serious critics
of banking secrecy, in addition to a series of individual countries and many
non-governmental organizations, are the OECD (who is engaged in a crusade
against what it calls unfair tax practices) and the European Union (who con-
siders the Swiss banking secrecy law one of the major unsolved problems on
the continent).
In an eﬀort to cut through the moralizing and judgmental mist of this
debate, Brevik and G¨ artner (2005) provide a positive general equilibrium
analysis of how banking secrecy aﬀects the domestic and international distri-
bution of income, wealth and welfare.1 Working with a computable n-country
overlapping generations model this paper shows that when a small group of
countries implements banking secrecy laws and withholding taxes, it beneﬁts
in many ways, such as through higher GNP and wealth, higher consumption,
higher wage rates, or a better provision of public goods despite lower tax
rates. This goes at the expense of all these variables changing in the oppo-
site direction in foreign countries. In particular, banking secrecy is found to
drive up income tax rates abroad while leading to an inferior provision of
public goods.
The latter result is particularly noteworthy, as it contradicts the claim
frequently made in policy circles and the popular press that the competition
from banking secrecy countries beneﬁts foreign countries also, by forcing
their high-spending governments to lower tax rates and reduce an overblown
public sector. This paper takes a closer look at this argument by studying
the sensitivity of the results presented and discussed in Brevik and G¨ artner
(2005) to eﬀorts to endogenize tax evasion by making the share of ﬁnancial
wealth kept in countries with banking secrecy responsive to tax diﬀerentials.
In order to single out the consequences of endogenizing tax evasion, the
remaining parts of our model will be the same as in Brevik and G¨ artner
(2005).
As regards endogenizing tax evasion, we consider two ways of doing this:
The ﬁrst one is mechanical and, therefore, simple. Tax evasion is postu-
1For partial equilibrium analyses with a strong game theoretic ﬂavor, see Bacchetta
and Espinosa, 1995, 2000; Kollintzas et al., 2000; Huizinga and Nielsen, 2003; Marchand
et al., 2003; or Eggert and Kolmar, 2004.
3lated to be a linear function of pecuniary incentives, as given by diﬀerences
in applicable income tax rates. The simplicity of this version provides the
ﬂexibility to determine thresholds at which the response of crucial macroeco-
nomic variables to the introduction of banking secrecy may change direction.
As a major drawback, this mechanical approach does not permit welfare
judgments. This is because it lacks an explicit micro foundation and, thus,
remains alien to the rest of the model. Our second approach, therefore, is to
model tax evasion as the result of an optimizing decision on the part of tax
payers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 starts by introducing the
model and setting it up for the extensions to be made in this paper, with
subsections 2.1 analyzing the behavior of the two generations of households
and subsection 2.2 deriving optimal government behavior for the general case
of potentially endogenous tax evasion. For easy reference and comparison,
section 3 replicates the results derived in Brevik and G¨ artner (2005), which
can be done by setting the appropriate response parameter in the tax evasion
equation equal to zero. Section 4 endogenizes tax evasion and, thus, permits
this response parameter to become positive. Subsection 4.1. does this in
a mechanical way, by simply postulating a linear relationship between the
fraction of ﬁnancial wealth held abroad and the incentives oﬀered by inter-
national diﬀerences in tax rates. The purpose of this exercise is to ﬁnd out
which variables are aﬀected in what manner when the tax elasticity of tax
evasion changes, and to identify crucial elasticity thresholds at which macro-
economic eﬀects switch directions. Subsection 4.2 proposes an optimizing
approach and broadens the perspective to include welfare eﬀects. Section 5
oﬀers a discussion of the obtained results, gauges their relevance against an
empirical benchmark, and sums up.
2 A multi-country model with bank secrecy
and withholding taxes
The model is an extension of the international OLG model discussed in Brevik
and G¨ artner (2005). We ﬁrst present and discuss a comprehensive general
formulation that sets the stage for speciﬁc ways to endogenize tax evasions.
Speciﬁc versions regarding the treatment of tax evasion will be analyzed
below.
42.1 Building blocks and household behavior
The global economy comprises a large number of countries that fall into two
types, subscripted eu and ch for easy reference. The two types diﬀer in pref-
erences and legal setting: 1) eu-type countries have a stronger preference
for government spending and 2) ch-type countries oﬀer foreign and domestic
investors access to secret bank accounts and levy a withholding tax on inter-
est income from such deposits. Each individual country is so small that it
ignores any responses its own saving and tax decisions may draw from other
countries.2
The world population L is given by the sum of the populations of the two
types of countries, L = Leu + Lch; and each type’s world population share
is denoted by lower case letters leu and lch. As we will later associate the
ch-type countries with tax havens, their share is assumed to be small.




The world capital market is fully integrated, which implies that the same
amount of capital per head will be available to workers in both countries.
Perfect competition ensures that pretax interest and wage rates are given by
the net marginal product of capital and labor, respectively,
r = αk
α−1 − δ
w = (1 − α)k
α,
(1)
where δ denotes the depreciation rate and α is capital’s share of output.
Individuals live for two periods. During the ﬁrst period of their lives, they
supply a ﬁxed amount of labor, which we normalize to one. During the
second period of their lives, they are rentiers, living oﬀ whatever wealth they
accumulated during the ﬁrst period of their lives, a, and the net interest
income derived from this wealth. For simplicity, we assume that the two
periods are of equal length and that there is no population growth. Agents’
lifetime utility U is determined by the logarithmic utility function
U = logcy + β log c
′
o + ψi(1 + β)logg, with i ∈ {eu,ch}. (2)
2The assumption that every country is small compared to the aggregate is natural, but
does not seem widely adopted in the literature, where the typical modeling approach is—
following the seminal work of Buiter, 1981, 1987; Dornbusch, 1985; Persson and Svensson,
1985; and Persson, 1983—a partial equilibrium analysis with one country or a general
equilibrium analysis with two large countries
5Thus, individuals derive utility from consumption when young, cy, and con-
sumption during retirement, c′
o, as well as from the level of government spend-
ing per capita, g.3 (c′
o is primed to avoid confusion with the consumption
of the current old generation.) We capture eu citizens’ stronger preference
for government spending by letting ψeu > ψch. Individuals enter the work-
force without wealth and leave no bequests. Each country is populated by
a large number of individuals. So, from the perspective of the individual
households, the level of government spending and wage, interest, and tax
rates are exogenous.
There is perfect competition in the political market also. This makes
governments set the tax rate so as to maximize the utility of the represen-
tative individual of its constituency. Given the long period length implied
by an OLG model with two generations, we assume that governments are
constrained to balance the budget on a period by period basis. Labor and
(declared) interest income is taxed on the basis of residency at a uniform
rate ti; unreported interest earned on funds kept in secret bank accounts
are taxed on a uniform withholding tax rate tf. Withholding taxes are not
repatriated to the country of residence. We denote per capita assets that
eu citizens hide abroad by F and let f be their share of eu citizens total
assets a (i.e., f = F/a). The fraction f is a function of the diﬀerence be-
tween the domestic income tax rate and the withholding tax rate, and any
costs incurred by transferring and keeping parts of their assets abroad and
retrieving earned interest, C(f,F).
f = f ((teu − tf),C (f,F)). (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that costs C(f,F) are incurred up
front. Denoting per capita tax revenues from labor, capital income, and




i , respectively, public spending per capita































The weight 1/2 that precedes all revenue sources reﬂects the fact that each
generation makes up half the population. Given our logarithmic utility func-
tion, the young generation in a ch-type country maximizes lifetime utility
by saving a fraction s = β/(1 + β) of their labor income and consuming the
3Including government spending directly in the utility function is a standard practice
in the optimal taxation literature, dating back to Mirrlees (1971).
6rest. Likewise, eu citizens maximize lifetime utility by consuming the frac-
tion s = β/(1 + β) of their labor income net of costs of hiding parts of their
wealth abroad. For given assets hidden abroad, this implies for eu citizens
that
ceu,y = (1 − s)
 










(1 − f)(1 − teu) + f(1 − tf)
 






The term ¯ t = ((1−f)teu +ftch) gives the eﬀective tax on capital income for
eu citizens. Assuming ch citizens declare all their capital income gives4
cch,y = (1 − s)(1 − tch)w










Governments set the income tax rate such that the marginal beneﬁts of an
increased rate (through higher government consumption) is exactly balanced













Each country is small relative to the global economy, so it expects that a
change to its tax rate has no eﬀect on either the gross wage rate or the gross
interest rate, since it has no impact on the global capital stock. For ch-type


































A one percentage-point increase in the ch tax rate lowers net wages and hence
consumption by a factor of 1/(1 − tch). The impact on the consumption of
4This is the case as long as the withholding tax rate exceed the income tax rate that
results for ch-type preferences.
7the old is larger, since it reduces both their accumulated wealth (the ﬁrst
term on the right hand side) and its net return (the last term). Finally, the
direct eﬀect of higher tax rates on government revenues is proportional to
how much of the tax base is aﬀected (1−T
f
ch/gch), while its negative impact
on the tax base itself (through less domestic savings) is proportional to the
fraction of capital income taxes to total taxes (T a
ch/gch). The corresponding
terms for the eu countries reﬂect the fact that eu citizens are using bank








































For given tax rates, the inﬂuence of tax changes on the consumption of the
young is the same in eu countries as in ch countries. This is also true for
the assets they accumulate, which is reﬂected in the last term of the second
equation. The direct inﬂuence of tax rates on the consumption of the old is
dampened both by the fact that only a fraction of capital income is declared
domestically (nominator in the ﬁrst term) and by the fact that eu citizens
increase their use of oﬀ-shore bank accounts (second term). This use of
oﬀ-shore bank accounts also spills over into the eﬀect of tax increases on
government revenues in the last equation. The immediate, positive inﬂuence
of tax increases on the government revenues (ﬁrst term) is dampened not
only by its adverse eﬀect on wealth accumulation (second term), but also by
a shift of savings to tax havens (last term).
3 Results with exogenous tax evasion
The model is calibrated to match an annualized real interest rate of 4 per-
cent (average annual pre-tax return to capital in the US national accounts
[MacGrattan and Prescott, 2003]), an income tax rate in eu countries of 50
percent and a government ratio in ch-type countries of 36 percent (ﬁgures for
Switzerland and the Eurozone from OECD, “Economic Outlook” and ECB,
“Statistics Pocket Book”, respectively). Capital’s share of output α is set to
0.3; the relative size of ch type countries (lch) to 1/30.
Figure 1 shows results with exogenous tax evasion. Up to small diﬀer-
ences in calibration, these results state those presented in Brevik and G¨ artner
8Figure 1: Impact of bank secrecy with unelastic tax evasion



































White bars indicate the value of variables before and dark bars the value
after the adoption of banking secrecy laws. The scale on the right measures
interest rates, tax rates and utility, which has been indexed to a value of
30 for the case without banking secrecy. The scale on the left measures
all other variables.
(2005). White bars show the situation without banking secrecy and thus re-
veal how diﬀerences in the intensity of preferences for public goods aﬀect
national economic outcomes. Dark bars depict the situation with banking
secrecy. Comparing adjacent white and dark bars reveals the changes that
have been triggered by the implementation of banking secrecy laws and with-
holding taxes in ch-type countries.
Since we are assuming a ﬁxed labor supply, the only channel through
which banking secrecy can inﬂuence gross variables (GDP, net wages, and
interest rates) is the capital stock. What happens in the version of the model
with exogenous tax evasion is that eu-type governments increase their tax
rates to compensate for the loss of revenues they experience as eu-residents
use banking secrecy to lessen their tax burden. For a given level of gross
labor income, this tax hike reduces disposable income, the pool from which
young eu-residents save. The windfall withholding tax revenues received by
9ch-type countries allow them to reduce the tax rate on wage income, thus
stimulating ch savings. Though the drop in the ch tax rate is greater than
the hike in the eu tax rate, the much larger share of eu residents in the world
population make overall savings fall.
Lower savings translate into a slightly lower equilibrium capital stock with
banking secrecy (ﬁrst bars from the left). This leaves the global economy
with less capital per worker, reducing global GDP, driving down wages, and
increasing the interest rate.
eu residents lose on most fronts: The higher eu tax rate and the lower
gross wage rate depress both consumption and wealth accumulation for the
young generation (second and fourth columns in the cluster). The old eu
generation is left with less wealth, but earns a higher post-tax rate of return.
(Since the eﬀective capital tax rate is a weighted average of the oﬃcial eu tax
rate and the withholding tax rate they pay on the capital they have shifted
abroad.) For this calibration, the net eﬀect is an increase in the consumption
of the old, but this is not very robust. Both generations are left with a lower
level of public good provision.
ch residents gain on all fronts, and substantially so. The lower ch tax
rate more than compensates the fall in the gross wage rate, leaving the
young generation with both higher consumption and higher savings. The
old generation starts oﬀ with more wealth and earns higher rates of return,
as the gross interest rate increases and the domestic income tax rate falls.
The withholding tax revenues allow the government to increase its public
good provision nevertheless.
4 Endogenizing tax evasion
The assumption that the dishonesty of eu-type tax payers, as measured by
the fraction f of their wealth they conceal from domestic tax authorities,
is exogenous simpliﬁes the analysis, but may not be very realistic. Having
laid down the implications of this special case for reference in section 3, we
now drop this assumption and make f endogenous. In a ﬁrst step we do so
in an ad-hoc fashion, by simply postulating f to be a linear function of the
beneﬁts expected from evading high domestic income tax rates. In a second
step we provide explicit micro foundations for the decision whether and to
what extent to evade taxes, and extend the model accordingly.
104.1 A mechanical approach
Suppose eu-type individuals hide a larger fraction of wealth in the bank
vaults of ch-type countries when the diﬀerence between domestic income tax
rates and the withholding tax rate increases. Let this tax evasion function
be linear, so that
f = a + b(teu − tf) (9)
With this speciﬁcation the derivative of f with respect to teu is exogenous.
Whether eu-type governments respond to banking secrecy with raised or
lowered taxes depends on how elastic f responds to income tax changes.
If f is unelastic to the tax rate, the government will raise the tax rate to
recapture some of the lost revenues, even if it means reduced consumption
for both generations. The higher the elasticity of f, the less attractive raising
tax rates becomes, because the higher tax revenues on declared income will
be increasingly oﬀset by more tax evasion.
For a given constant term a each b translates into a speciﬁc elasticity of f
with respect to (teu −tf). It is this tax elasticity of tax evasion ǫ
f
t that must
be expected to be a crucial determinant of eu tax rates:5 if it is high enough,
the eu governments will lower their tax rates in response to the introduction
of secret bank accounts. Figure 2 shows the numerical results.
Bold solid lines show how the eu-type countries’ response of the indicated
variable to the introduction of banking secrecy varies with the tax elasticity
of tax evasion. They are measured on the left vertical axis. Bolds dashed
lines show the respective response in ch-type countries as measured on the
scale given on the right vertical axis. Thin solid lines show global averages
(where each type of country is weighted by its relative size).
In all nine panels the values measured at the left vertical axis, reﬂecting
the case where f has zero tax elasticity, coincides with the results shown in
ﬁgure 1, where f was exogenous. Panel (a) shows that this fraction of 10
percent of eu-type wealth being held abroad increases at an accelerating pace
as the the tax elasticity of f increases.
One general result to note before we look into details is that the direction
in which crucial macroeconomic aggregates respond in ch-type countries is
independent of ǫ
f
t. When this elasticity rises, it makes the consequences from
the introduction of banking secrecy stronger, but it never changes direction.6











6To be more precise, this only holds for those variables that are not equalized across
borders by perfect competition. The direction in which those variables change, which are
identical in all countries (capital stock per capita, per capita GDP, pre-tax interest and
wage rates), is the same as in eu-type countries and thus may depend on ǫ
f
t .






































































































Bold solid lines indicate the response of the respective variable to the
adoption of banking secrecy laws at diﬀerent income-tax elasticities of tax
evasion in eu-type countries. Bold dashed lines indicate the response in
ch-type countries. Thin lines indicate global averages.
12This does not apply to eu-type countries, however.
Panel (b) shows how eu-type governments adjust income tax rates in
response to the erosion of their tax base due to the introduction of banking
secrecy abroad. It turns out that when the tax elasticity of f is small or
moderate, the response is to counter the erosion of the tax base by raising
the income tax rate. This response becomes more moderate, however, as
this elasticity increases, and it even turns negative once the tax elasticity
of f passes a threshold of about 0.3 for most variables. As the amounts
transferred to ch accounts increase with the elasticity of f, so do withholding-
tax revenues of ch governments. Some of the revenues are passed on to the
population in the form of lower income tax rates until these hit a bottom at
the lower bound of zero.
The direction of the impact of banking secrecy on global savings depends
on whether the tax elasticity of tax evasion is below or above the intersection
point of the thin line in panel (b) and the horizontal axis. If the elasticity is
lower than at the point of intersection, the average tax rate paid by the young
generation increases. This leaves fewer resources for savings and depresses
the steady state capital stock.
Panel (c) shows that the provision of public goods in eu-type countries
always deteriorates when ch-type countries implement banking secrecy laws.
While this eﬀect remains relatively moderate when ǫ
f
t is small, it becomes
stronger and stronger as ǫ
f
t rises. The only other eﬀect that never changes
direction as we vary the tax elasticity of tax evasion is the consumption of
the old generation [panel (h)]. This is always aﬀected positively, in both
countries, and more strongly as ǫ
f
t becomes larger.
Panel (d) is quite interesting, reporting the consequences for the global
capital stock. Since capital is perfectly mobile, global per capita values are
the same as capital per capita in each individual country. The graph shows
that the response of the capital stock (and global wealth, which is the same)
crucially depends on ǫ
f
t. As long as tax payers’ dishonesty is relative robust
to changes in tax incentives, the introduction of banking secrecy makes the
global capital stock shrink. Beyond the threshold for ǫ
f
t we already encoun-
tered above this eﬀect is reversed. Banking secrecy then encourages capital
accumulation on a global scale. Reﬂecting our assumption of a given la-
bor supply, the response of global and national GDP per capita, shown in
panel (f), is identical, except for magnitude, to what happens to productive
capital.7
We look at panel (e) in order to see where changes in the global capital
7The same threshold applies to the eﬀect on other global variables (such as wage and
interest rates) or averages (such as the average tax rate shown in panel (b)).
13stock originate. Wealth in ch-type countries always beneﬁts from the imple-
mentation of banking secrecy. Wealth in eu-type countries typically suﬀers,
until a critical value of ǫ
f
t is reached beyond which wealth eﬀects turn positive
as well.
Panels (g) and (h) show the consequences for consumption. The robust
positive eﬀect on retirement-age consumption has already been noted above.
The working generation always beneﬁts in ch-type countries. This generation
usually looses in eu-type countries, except for scenarios with rather high tax
elasticities of tax evasion.
The last panel (i) shows the eﬀect on factor prices, which are identical
in both groups of countries. These eﬀects mirror each other. Initially, when
ǫ
f
t is zero, the implementation of banking secrecy laws boosts interest rates
most and has the severest negative eﬀect on wage rates. This is, of course,
being due to the capital stock being driven down, which makes this factor of
production scarcer and, thus, more productive at the margin, and the other
factor of production less productive. As higher values of ǫ
f
t make the capital
stock drop less, the response of w and r is muted. When ǫ
f
t reaches the
threshold where the capital stock is not aﬀected by banking secrecy, wages
and interest rates are not aﬀected either. Beyond that threshold, wages
and interest rates respond with the opposite sign of their response at low
elasticities.
4.2 An optimizing approach
We now make tax evasion part of the optimization decisions households need
to take. When households decide what share of their wealth to keep in
foreign bank accounts they weigh beneﬁts against costs, but take income and
withholding tax rates as given. So each household ﬁgures that its allocation
of ﬁnancial wealth will not trigger a government response in the form of tax
changes. On the other hand, when governments set income tax rates, they
do anticipate household responses.
4.2.1 Preliminary considerations
The representative household’s beneﬁts of tax evasion are straightforward.
They are simply the taxes saved and, thus, reﬂect those parameters that
determine tax savings. For a given amount of wealth, these parameters are:
the fraction of wealth held in tax haven countries, the interest rate, and the
diﬀerence between income tax rates at home and the foreign withholding tax.
Thus total beneﬁts B are given by
B = r(teu − tf)f, (10)
14which, for a given interest rate and tax diﬀerential, may be drawn as a
straight line through the origin in a diagram with beneﬁts on the vertical
and the tax evasion fraction f on the horizontal axis (see ﬁgure 3).
The costs of tax evasion are a lot more complex:
To begin with, there are ﬁxed costs involved that are very much inde-
pendent of f—at least as long as f is rather moderate. These costs include
setting up and maintaining an account or depot with a foreign bank, and of
repatriating (part of) the return and the invested amount during retirement,
for which regular bank connections would be too risky to use. In ﬁgure 3
these ﬁxed costs can be represented by a horizontal line.
A second type of costs varies with the fraction of ones wealth concealed
abroad. These variable costs derive from two major sources. One relates to
the expected value of sanctions, which reﬂects the probability of being caught
and the applicable ﬁne or punishment when caught. Both these variables
rise with the amount of wealth hidden abroad and with the related capital
income one attempts to retrieve and spend in one’s country of residence.
Secondly, costs go up when f rises because the gap widens between the
consumption pattern and lifestyle that ﬁts ones declared income and the
lifestyle potentially supported by one’s actual income. Eﬀorts will be required
to keep this discrepancy from growing too blatant. But this will involve costs.
Some of these will be direct expenditures for bank commissions, trips or legal
counsel. Others will be indirect in the sense that an increasing proportion
of capital income from abroad must be put to ineﬃcient use in order not to
raise red ﬂags with tax authorities.8
In terms of a diagram such as Figure 3, top panel, costs rise as f increases.
It is the speciﬁc nature of this cost line that determines how the optimal value
of f responds to changes in the tax diﬀerential, however. Since we can only
speculate about the details of the shape of the cost line, we look at a few
plausible cases that may occur in order to develop a feel for likely outcomes:
One possibility is that variable costs only kick in beyond a threshold f1,
increase linearly with f for a while, until they hit a maximum at a second
threshold f2. Combined with our linear beneﬁts line this produces a stepwise
tax-evasion function that is composed of three horizontal segments which
indicate three corner solutions for f as displayed in the lower part of ﬁgure
3:
As long as the tax diﬀerential is small and, for a given interest rate, the
beneﬁts line is not steeper than the solid straight line that touches the cost
8For instance, one may not dare to live in the house one could actually aﬀord, keep
the children in public schools though one would be quite happy to pay for a better private
institution, or prefer to keep one’s most expensive works of art in a secluded room rather
than exhibiting them for all visitors to see.
15Figure 3: Costs, beneﬁts, and optimal tax evasion I
The two panels show that a stepwise tax evasion function results when the
cost line consists of linear segments as shown in the upper panel.
16line at point B, households do not transfer ﬁnancial wealth abroad, since
costs exceed beneﬁts. Therefore, the optimal value for f is zero. Once the
beneﬁts line turns steeper than the solid line, net beneﬁts are maximized by
setting f = f1. Because of the kink in the cost line, this fraction remains
optimal even if the tax diﬀerential rises still further. Only after it turns even
steeper than the dashed line (then the vertical distance between point C and
the beneﬁts line starts to exceed the vertical distance between point B and
the beneﬁts line), net beneﬁts from hiding ﬁnancial wealth in foreign bank
accounts are maximized at a value of f = 1.
Two of the encountered solutions occur are at the empirically implausible
values of f = 0 and f = 1. Ruling these out as they do not appear to be
relevant in real life, f would be stuck at f = f1. There, locally, for a range
of tax diﬀerentials, tax evasion is inelastic with respect to international tax
diﬀerences. So, the results presented in section 3 apply.
Another plausible shape of the cost function, shown in ﬁgure 4, upper
panel, is that beyond the threshold f1 marginal costs rise, until costs hit a
ceiling at f2. If the segment of the cost function between these crucial values





C0 if 0 < f ≤ f1,
C0 + c1(f1 − f)2 if f1 < f ≤ f2,
C2 if f2 < f,
(11)
the ﬁrst-order condition for maximum net beneﬁts B − C in the segment
where the quadratic cost relationship applies yields the tax evasion function
f = 0.5r(teu − tf) + 2c1f1 (12)
This is a straight line (shown in the lower part of ﬁgure 4), as was the
relationship postulated in our mechanical approach of section 4.1. Therefore,
the results derived there apply.
The discussion in this section has argued for some general properties the
cost function should have. We have also seen that for some speciﬁc cost lines,
as proposed in ﬁgures 3 and 4, tax evasion functions that had already been
analyzed previously. These are special cases however. In general, other cost
functions are viable and should lead to more complex tax evasion functions,
and a potentially richer set of results. We now turn to such options and
integrate them into our model.
4.2.2 A general speciﬁcation and a numerical solution
As a very general speciﬁcation, assume that the marginal cost of evading one
dollar of taxes is the following nonlinear function of the fraction of wealth
17Figure 4: Costs, beneﬁts, and optimal tax evasion II
The two panels show that any quadratic segment in the cost line implies
an upward-sloping linear segment in the tax evasion function.



















The two panels show how diﬀerent parameterizations of a general marginal
cost function (left panel) imply diﬀerent tax evasion functions (right panel)
with diﬀerent elasticities of tax evasion at a targeted point of intersection.
already hidden from tax authorities
MC = ξ
 




Two numerical speciﬁcations of this function are shown in the left-hand panel
of ﬁgure 5. The solid line has both parameters η and θ set to 0.5. This yields
an s-shaped marginal cost function starting at zero when no taxes are evaded
and reaching ξ when no interest income is declared. The shape is meant to
capture both the increasing transaction costs involved in repatriating secret
funds for consumption and the increasing eﬀort necessary to avoid detection
from the tax authorities. When only a small fraction of wealth is transferred
abroad, both costs are negligible, as a small reduction in declared wealth is
unlikely to raise red ﬂags with the tax authorities and keeping a small portion
of wealth abroad may also make sense from a portfolio perspective.
Costs of avoiding detection might be explosive as the declared capital
incomes goes to zero and ever more intricate schemes are needed to ward
oﬀ suspicious authorities. This justiﬁes the steep slope toward the end of
the curve. The marginal shoe-leather costs involved in turning around secret
capital income in consumption is also likely to be increasing as consumption
patterns has to be adjusted to allow for spending out of undeclared income,
but there is no reason to think these should be explosive.
Combining the explosive marginal costs of detection avoidance with in-
creasing, but non-explosive, marginal shoe-leather costs yields the postulated
19s-shaped curve.
The dashed line results when the function is parametrized with (η,γ) =
(2,6). There marginal cost increase quickly at low levels of f, then peak
early and remain constant thereafter.
While the marginal costs of tax avoidance are increasing, the marginal
beneﬁts are constant, as argued above. Optimality involves setting the frac-
tion of undeclared wealth to the level where, at the margin, the costs of
leaving more wealth undeclared exactly match marginal beneﬁts. Solving











The tax evasion function, derived from beneﬁts given by equation (10) and
costs given by equation (13) and plotted in the right hand panel of ﬁgure 5 is
also s-shaped. Both parameterizations of the tax evasion function intersect
where f=0.1, which is the evasion fraction to which we have calibrated the
model. The dashed line is rather ﬂat when it passes through this point and,
thus, implies a low tax elasticity ǫ
f
t. The solid line is noticeably steeper and
harbors a much higher tax evasion elasticity of ǫ
f
t.
5 Discussion and conclusions
Our analysis suggests that the consequences of bank secrecy laws and with-
holding taxes for countries that have adopted such laws, and for those coun-
tries that have not, can be reliably derived under the simplifying assumption
that the share of ﬁnancial wealth held abroad is exogenous. Endogenizing
this share reﬁnes and complicates matters, but does not lead to any qual-
itative changes as long as the income-tax elasticity of tax evasion remains
small to moderate: countries implementing bank secrecy beneﬁt in the form
of lower income tax rates, better provision of public goods, higher income
and wealth, and improved consumption. Those countries without banking
secrecy laws pay for this: the provision of public goods deteriorates, despite
a hike in income tax rates, and income and wealth falls. The only variable
to improve is retirement-age consumption.
There is a critical value for the income-tax elasticity of tax evasion, how-
ever, beyond which the response of certain variables changes direction. This
does not hold for ch-type countries, though. They always beneﬁt in the way
sketched above, no matter how high the tax elasticity of tax evasion is. But
the governments of eu-type countries now need to lower income tax rates in
20Figure 6: Impact of bank secrecy with very elastic tax evasion


































White columns indicate the value of variables before and dark columns the
value after the adoption of banking secrecy laws. The scale on the right
measures interest rates, tax rates and utility, which has been indexed to
a value of 30 for the case without banking secrecy. The scale on the left
measures all other variables.
order to minimize the negative repercussions from banking secrecy on their
country’s tax income and the provision of public goods. This is an interest-
ing case, since it could support the argument that banking secrecy serves a
wider, unselﬁsh purpose by keeping taxes and government spending in check
abroad.
Since these results only obtain when tax evasion is very elastic with re-
spect to changes in tax rates, the relevance of the case of banking secrecy
making income tax rates fall in other countries needs to be judged on em-
pirical grounds. A number of empirical studies exist that may be of help.9
A recent and probably one of the most comprehensive pertinent studies is
Huizinga and Nicod` eme (2004). These authors do not directly estimate the
elasticity we are looking for. But we may use their coeﬃcient estimates to
9Examples are Grilli (1989), Alworth and Andresen (1992), Fornari and Levy (2000)
and Huizinga and Nicod` eme (2004)
21compute the income-tax elasticity of tax evasion indirectly. Proceeding as
described in footnote 3, the tax elasticity of international capital ﬂows im-
plied by the regression results reported in Huizinga and Nicod` eme’s table
9, equation (1) is about 0.03.10 This is very low, certainly much smaller
than the thresholds reported in ﬁgure2 above, and does not recommend the
side-eﬀect of falling tax rates abroad as an empirically compelling case.
On the other hand, data on international portfolios may not be consid-
ered sharp and comprehensive enough to generate much trust in empirical
estimates derived from them. With such reservations, it may still be possible
that income tax rates in countries without banking secrecy would be higher if
banking secrecy was dropped. Even if that was correct, however, our analysis
would not support the conclusion typically associated with such a scenario,
namely that banking secrecy was good for other countries. Our analysis says
that even when foreign countries feel compelled to reduce income tax rates
and enjoy a boost to economic activity in the private sector, their welfare,
the ultimate measure of how well its people are doing, suﬀers. This happens
through three channels: ﬁrst, when tax rates are lower, public spending is
lower, below the level desired by households. Second, part of the taxes its
citizens eﬀectively pay end up in the purses of foreign governments, and eu
citizens get nothing in return. Third, tax evasion is costly. At least part of
these costs must be considered dead-weight loss that has to be conducted
from the resources potentially available for private and public consumption.
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